The five-step plan.

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Jon Daniels and Thad Levine had just completed their first season as
Rangers GM and assistant GM.  Big changes were already underway.  Buck Showalter was dismissed in October, Ron
Washington hired in November. 

 

Between those two events, as Texas was interviewing managerial candidates,
Type A free agents Carlos Lee and Gary Matthews Jr. declared free agency, as
did Type B’s Vicente Padilla, Mark DeRosa, and Rod Barajas.  Knowing realistically that the first four
would find multi-year deals on the open market, Texas was prepared to risk arbitration offers
to each of them, setting itself up for a haul of compensatory picks.  The organization knew it was poised for an
impact draft in June 2007.

 

Meanwhile, that same October, as the Rangers were home for the playoffs
for the seventh straight season, Levine spent a good amount of time studying
every playoff team from the previous 20 years. 
Not because he had nothing better to do. 
The exercise had purpose.

 

It would be a relatively quiet winter in terms of free agent
acquisitions.  Frank Catalanotto, a
fringy Type A himself, was added, costing Texas the 16th pick the
following June (guess what: if Texas had managed to lose just one more game in
2006, or if Cincinnati would have won one extra game, Catalanotto would have
cost the club the 80th pick rather than the 16th), but no
other Type A was signed.  It’s not as if
the Rangers chose to stay out of the market – they were competitive on Barry
Zito and Mark Mulder and Daisuke Matsuzaka – but as it turned out, the only
free agent deals of lasting note that Texas closed that off-season (other than the
reupping with Padilla) went to Eric Gagné, Kenny Lofton, and Marlon Byrd, all
that December.  One-year deals in each
case.  By design.

 

Byrd was viewed as a low-risk bet to become what he has in fact become,
a hitter with the chance to break out in new surroundings and with a different
batting coach, that is, another Matthews, another DeRosa.

 

Gagné and Lofton filled holes on the roster but, as one-year players,
were also considered candidates to give Texas what Ugueth Urbina had four years
earlier: a flippable commodity if things worked out for the player but not for
the team as the season passed the midway point.

 

Hopes were high as the 2007 season got underway, not an unnatural
phenomenon when a new manager is in place (and in the Rangers’ case, there was
the added gimmick point that both the Yankees and Diamondbacks had each won the
World Series in their first season without Showalter).  The club went 16-11 in spring training under Washington, and the
optimists had some company.

 

But Kevin Millwood, Padilla, and winter trade acquisition Brandon
McCarthy each lost to the Angels in the season-opening series in Anaheim.  Texas then won home series with Boston and
Tampa Bay, momentarily reaching the .500 mark at 4-4 before the final Rays
game, erasing the bad taste of the Angels set. 

 

Until the club lost 14 of the next 20, and 31 of 46, putting them at a
Major League-worst 19-35 at the end of May, 13.5 games behind the Angels in the
West.

 

Sometime during that month, the research that Levine had done in
October was dusted off, perhaps sooner than he and Daniels had planned.  The question Levine had asked himself, when
examining those 20 years’ worth of playoff clubs – and particularly the 20
franchises that had reached the post-season in the seven years since the
Rangers had last done so – was why Texas hadn’t achieved the same success.

 

In May 2007, it was already apparent to Daniels and Levine that it was
going to be eight straight seasons that would end with number 162.

 

The biggest gut-check conclusion that Levine had reached as a result of
his study centered on the Rangers’ best player.

 

Levine says that as he broke down what the two previous decades of playoff
franchises had done to make themselves playoff franchises, he was able to
identify 10 or 12 defined steps.  From
those he narrowed it down to five steps that showed up over and over and seemed
to fit best with what Texas
seemed capable of executing. 
Specifically, the five steps represented a relatively uniform rebuilding
model espoused by Atlanta near the beginning of
that 20-year period, Oakland midway through that
span, and Arizona, Cleveland,
Colorado, and Minnesota more recently.

 

So, just as the process of choosing Washington was in motion in October
of 2006, the idea of the five-step plan was being formulated as well, and if it
hadn’t been for the team’s poor start in 2007, things might have looked
dramatically different, and not better, for this franchise today.

 

A notoriously slow starter annually, Mark Teixeira had gotten off to a
miserable .231/.346/.341 start in the 2007 season’s first month, but was among
the league’s best players in May, hitting .349/.438/.661 as the team limped to
a 9-20 record for the month.  He was off
to an even stronger run in June, hitting .364/.481/.909 in seven games before
injuring a quad muscle on June 8, a night on which, despite a 9-6 win over Milwaukee, Texas
stood 16.5 games out of first in the West and continued to own baseball’s worst
record.

 

The Teixeira injury came one day after the Rangers brandished their
heavy draft ammunition, taking Blake Beavan and Julio Borbon with picks they’d
received for the loss of Lee to the Astros, Michael Main and Neil Ramirez as compensation
for the loss of Matthews to the Angels, and Tommy Hunter with an extra pick
awarded for the loss of DeRosa to the Cubs, all in the draft’s first
round.  But it was well before the Teixeira
injury, and the milestone draft, that Daniels and Levine and their crew of
advisors had taken a close look at Step One of the five-step plan and
determined, with management’s green light, that Teixeira was going to be the
subject of a difficult, unpopular decision.

 

A look at Step One, and the four that followed it:

 

STEP ONE: Divest at the top.  The Braves blazed a trail
19 years ago when they made the hugely unpopular decision to trade Dale
Murphy.  It wasn’t the sole reason that Atlanta went from
reaching the playoffs once in Murphy’s 15 seasons with the club to doing so every year but one in the following 15, but it got
the ball rolling.  Levine has referred to
this phase of the plan as a “strategic teardown,” a move to part with a very
popular but overly expensive player – whether because he’s past his prime
(Murphy was 34) or overpaid based on his productivity – no matter what the P.R.
implications might be.  The result: a
reduced and more balanced payroll (Levine did extensive data-crunching on what
percentage of payroll the successful teams of the previous 20 years paid their top
four players) and the paving of the way for Step Two.

 

Oakland followed the Atlanta blueprint with
Mark McGwire.  Minnesota: Chuck Knoblauch.  Cleveland:
Jim Thome and Bartolo Colon.  Colorado: Mike
Hampton and Larry Walker (flipping him for St. Louis’s Chris Narveson, Luis
Martinez, and Matt Burch days after Walker vetoed the deal that would have made
Ian Kinsler and Erik Thompson Rockies).  Arizona: Luis
Gonzalez. 

 

Atlanta
later followed its own model by going forward without Tom Glavine, John Smoltz,
Kevin Millwood, Rafael Furcal, Javy Lopez, and Ryan Klesko.

 

Kansas City
didn’t move Mike Sweeney and probably should have.  The later Colorado edition didn’t move Todd Helton but
overcame it with one of the greatest Septembers in baseball history.  A number of teams (e.g.,
Pittsburgh
moving Brian Giles) bit the bullet and made the difficult move but didn’t
execute Step Two properly.

 

STEP TWO: Reinvest at the foundation.  Reducing spending at the
big league level isn’t enough, as plenty of franchises have proven.  Reallocating resources toward scouting (draft
and international and minor league coverage) and player development is what the
model dictates.  It’s not just throwing
more cash at amateur players to sign them (whether that means exceeding slot in
the draft or ponying up internationally), though that’s part of it, and making
poor decisions in those areas can set a franchise back as surely as hitting on
players consistently can accelerate the process.  It’s also expanding the scouting staff where
appropriate, hiring the right people to man the scouting and development posts (to
increase the odds that the acquisition decisions are good ones, and to maximize
the odds of converting potential into results once the players are in the
system), and establishing an aggressiveness and excellence that creates a
reputation in the various talent markets.

 

STEP THREE: Accelerate, challenge.  This is one stage that occasionally
gets overlooked by some in the media, or misinterpreted.  The five clubs that successfully implemented
the Atlanta
model each committed to challenging their young players at the big league
level. 

 

Among the trends that Levine discovered, by looking at all players to
accumulate 2,500 plate appearances or 800 innings pitched (or 250 games
pitched) since 1950, were the following:

 

  • Major league ballplayers
    tend to peak between age 26 and age 31
  • 90 percent of
    hitters reach their career norms after amassing 750 at-bats in the big
    leagues
  • 82 percent of
    pitchers reach their career norms after logging 100 innings in the big
    leagues

 

The idea, then, is not simply stripping payroll to put an inexpensive
team on the field.  It’s pushing young
players in the developmental process, in part, so that the acclimation period
gets underway, and out of the way.  Feed
those 750 at-bats and 100 innings to key young players, and reap the benefits
sooner.

 

STEP FOUR: Lock in the core.  While the six teams in the
study each went down this path to an extent, it’s a maneuver that John Hart
often gets credited for pioneering during his Indians days.  The organization’s job is to properly
identify a core of players (usually homegrown) that it believes will be
integral parts of a winning ballclub, and attempt to sign those players to
long-term contracts, often well before the player has the right to explore free
agency but spanning into that period of the player’s career.

 

The benefits to the team: Getting a core player under control for a
long term, ideally covering his expected prime seasons.  Cost certainty that enhances the club’s
ability to effectively plan over multiple years.  Potential savings over the life of the
contract.  Marketing and community
opportunities that grow out of the long-term commitment between team and
player.

 

The benefit to the player: Financial security, guarding against the
risk of injury or ineffectiveness.  In
exchange for the potential discount the player gives the team by locking up
through the arbitration years and into free agency by a year or two, the player
and his family are set for life – and he’ll typically still be in his prime
when the lock-up deal expires, in a position to land a much bigger contract
after that (if not already extended by the club before expiration).

 

A favorite Levine quote that I like a lot: “Muscle is easier to buy
than heart and soul.”  It’s the heart and
soul types that you want to lock up as you move into Step Four of the five-part
plan.  There’s a reason that George Brett
and Robin Yount and Derek Jeter and Kirby Puckett and Chipper Jones were never
allowed to leave, and that Albert Pujols and Dustin Pedroia won’t be,
either.  Same can be said for Michael
Young.

 

STEP FIVE: Bang.  When the time is right – and this calls for a
different kind of patience from the scouting and development brand, but just as
much of it – go to ownership and recommend a significant spike in payroll,
whether to retain the core players identified in Step Four, add impact players
through trades or free agency, or both. 
Think you still need some muscle in a spot or two to put you over the
top?  Go out and buy it.

 

A good recent example of a club, though not among the six that followed
the full Atlanta rebuilding blueprint, that targeted one final piece as it made
what it believed was a legitimate push for a championship run, was Philadelphia
and Brad Lidge in 2008.  In 1991-93,
helping build its two World Series winners, Toronto went out and acquired veterans David
Cone, Dave Winfield, Paul Molitor, and Rickey Henderson. 

 

When is the time right?  The
answer: When the time is right.  It’s an
inexact matter of timing (at least as far as the acquisition of players from
the outside is concerned), a determination that the club is a key piece or two
short of joining Atlanta, Oakland, Arizona, Cleveland, Colorado, and Minnesota
on that list.

 

So, having made the decision in 2006 to figure out what the common
steps were that successful rebuilding clubs had taken, and the determination in
the spring of 2007 that it was time, with the blessing of ownership, to launch
the five-step plan, what did the Rangers do, and how have they fared?

 

STEP ONE: Divest at the top. 

Ask yourself this: If Texas had gotten off to
a good start in 2007 and was hanging around in contention into the summer,
would the club have traded Teixeira that season?  As difficult as the decision to trade
Teixeira must have been, it’s hard to imagine the club doing it during a season
that still meant something.  Easy enough
in fantasy league baseball.  Not so much
when there’s a clubhouse and a fan base that management has to consider when
thinking about running up a white flag on a season.  Not the message you want to send your
players, or your fans.

 

And, under that scenario, if the Rangers had waited until the winter
following the 2007 season to shop Teixeira, would they have been able to get
Elvis Andrus, Matt Harrison, Jarrod Saltalamacchia, Neftali Feliz, and Beau
Jones from the Braves? 

 

No chance. 

 

Although we as fans didn’t know it at the time, Atlanta GM John
Schuerholz – the pioneer of the model that Daniels and Levine were trying to
emulate – was months away from resigning and moving into the club president
position.  Schuerholz was gunning in July
2007 for one last title, and overpaid in young players to get Teixeira (a
Georgia Tech All-American) for the 2007 stretch run (and the 2008 season).  He turned the reins over to Frank Wren in
October 2007 (having not reached the playoffs with Teixeira), and Wren would
have never loaded up that off-season with the same five-player package for just
one season of Teixeira – especially since Wren would have been understandably concerned
with a much bigger picture as the Braves’ new GM than Schuerholz was in the
second half of his swan song season.

 

The poor start in 2007, then, allowed Texas to begin the strategic
teardown by moving Teixeira at the perfect time (Atlanta would flip him a year
later, with Teixeira one season closer to free agency, for the underwhelming
package of Casey Kotchman and Stephen Marek), ignoring the message it might
have sent at the time to the casual fan and general columnist in the market, if
not the clubhouse itself.  

 

Texas
padded the haul it extracted for Teixeira by moving Gagné and Lofton the same
week for David Murphy, Max Ramirez, Engel Beltre, and Kason Gabbard.

 

STEP TWO: Reinvest at the foundation. 

 

Texas
has paid above slot in recent years to sign players drafted by Ron Hopkins and
his crew of scouts, such as Teixeira, Derek Holland, Justin Smoak, Taylor
Teagarden, Borbon, Jake Brigham, Neil Ramirez, Marcus Lemon, Robbie Ross, Clark
Murphy, Johnny Whittleman, Kyle Ocampo, and Matt Thompson, and others.  The club is surely prepared to do so for
Tuesday’s top two picks, lefthander Matt Purke and righthander Tanner
Scheppers, if not others in this year’s draft crop.  And even when targeting slot players, the
club has done well.  The last few Rangers
drafts have been solid.

 

Under the leadership of A.J. Preller, Don Welke, Manny Batista, and Jim
Colborn, the club has stepped up internationally as well, signing players like
Martin Perez, Fabio Castillo, Cristian Santana, Richard Alvarez, and the 2006 crop
that featured Wilmer Font, Wilfredo Boscan, Kennil Gomez, Carlos Pimentel,
Geuris Grullon, and Leonel De Los Santos, not to mention Yoon-Hee Nam, a
lefthander out of South Korea who has exploded this season.  Texas is also
mentioned in connection with any number of the top prospects in this year’s
July 2 Latin America class. 

 

In 2006, the organization opened a new state-of-the-art baseball
academy in the Dominican
Republic. 

 

The organization’s player development operation, headed by Scott
Servais, is as full of “prospects” as the system’s minor league rosters
are. 

 

The Rangers are a top-tier franchise right now in the areas that make
up Step Two, without which it’s probably fair to say they might not be judged
as having the consensus number one farm system in the game.

 

STEP THREE: Accelerate, challenge. 

 

Levine told reporters just before the 2008 season that the Rangers were
“about at Step Three.”  Since then, first
base and catcher and shortstop and most of the outfield have been turned over
to players with fewer than those 750 at-bats, and a significant number of
rookie pitchers have been brought to the big leagues and placed in meaningful
roles.  There’s no question that the
organization is challenging its young players.

 

STEP FOUR: Lock in the core. 

 

First it was Hank Blalock and Young, both of whom were locked up while
Hart was still running the club.  Daniels
extended Kinsler, and the club had talks this spring with Josh Hamilton.  It wouldn’t be out of the question for the
club to sit down with Frankie Francisco and Nelson Cruz this winter to talk
about long-term possibilities.

 

STEP FIVE: Bang.  

 

We’re not at Step Five yet.  But how
close are we?

 

Although nobody internally was selling this 2009 club short, it’s fair
to say that the organization, and certainly fans and media, expected the
concept of Step Five to be one that wouldn’t come into play until 2010.  That still might be the case, particularly in
view of the ownership situation (though you’d expect that Texas would have gone with “safer” picks than
Purke and Scheppers on Tuesday if ability to pay were an issue).

 

But if the state
of ownership isn’t a factor, considering the depth of the farm system, which
allowed the club to take high-reward risks this week in the draft, would it be
unwise to roll the dice on an impact bat or starter this summer, knowing you’d
recoup two premium picks in the next draft for every acquired “rental” that leaves
in free agency this winter – and recognizing that there are a number of
potential trade targets who wouldn’t be rentals at all? 

 

What if there’s an
acquirable bat or arm or both that could ultimately be the difference between
the playoffs and finishing two games out?  Given where this thing stands into
mid-June, do you not take the chance on that post-season possibility?

 

Getting Hamilton back will
help.  Jason Grilli might help.  Maybe Orlando Hernandez will, too, or even
Feliz (but not Scheppers).  I’m thinking
bigger. 

 

Is it time, given
the wealth of prospects the team has acquired and developed, to explore a
Teixeira-type trade or a Gagné-esque trade – from the other side?

 

The bullpen is the
first order of business, and that was the case even before Francisco’s shoulder
issue.  How much better would things line
up if the club didn’t have to regularly count on Jason Jennings and Eddie
Guardado to protect leads in the back third of the game, if Darren O’Day settled
in as the seventh-inning man, if C.J. Wilson was available for a pivotal seventh-
or eighth-inning spot, and a lockdown righthander was around to own the eighth?
 Adding an impact arm in the bullpen
would help Texas
avoid overexposing (or overworking) its key relievers, and help protect against
the possibility that Francisco’s health will be an issue all summer.

 

Huston Street?  Bobby Jenks? 
Kerry Wood?  Danys Baez?  Octavio Dotel? 
Rafael Betancourt?  Chad Qualls?  LaTroy Hawkins?  My man Kiko Calero?  The struggling Russ Springer (who would
probably push Jennings
down but not O’Day)?  Boston has Manny Delcarmen, Ramon Ramirez,
Takashi Saito, Justin Masterson, and Daniel Bard from the right side.  Would they dare move one? 

 

What about a
starting pitcher like Cliff Lee or Josh Johnson or Matt Cain or Roy Oswalt, or
even Roy Halladay?  Not one of them would
be a rental, each controllable at least through 2010.

 

What if Brandon
Webb comes back soon and shows his shoulder is sound again?

 

Maybe it’s just an
epidemic slump, but this lineup has become too easy to pitch to lately.  I think back to the pair of trades Tom Grieve
made for Julio Franco and Rafael Palmeiro in December 1998, trying to make the lineup
less reliant on power, less prone to the strikeout, and more of a unit that pressured
the opponent by reaching base.  More modern
example: Milton Bradley in 2008.  Given
how the Texas
lineup shapes up, we’d probably be talking about a DH.

 

What about Brad
Hawpe, who is reaching base 41 percent of the time?  He earns about $3 million the rest of the way
this year and $7.5 million in 2010 (his $10 million club option for 2011 voids
if Colorado
trades him).  (Incidentally, two years
and four days ago, the day after the Beavan/Main/Borbon/Ramirez/Hunter draft, I
wrote: “And who knows, maybe three years from now, Rangers general manager Jon
Daniels [yes, that’s right] trades Main and third baseman Emmanuel Solis, both
of whom are starring in Frisco, and big league left fielder Chad Tracy to
Colorado for free-agent-to-be outfielder Brad Hawpe, who helps Texas separate
itself from the Angels on the way to a playoff berth.”)

 

Forget Todd
Helton, who is owed about $50 million between now and the time he can be dismissed
after the 2011 season.

 

Would Cleveland consider moving
Victor Martinez and the $10 million he’s due over the next season and a half?  Significant contract, but a huge bargain.

 

Adam Dunn?  Jeremy Hermida?

 

Notably, other than
some of the relief pitchers (who are generally less expensive in prospects than
starters or hitters), every one of the players listed above would be under
control beyond 2009.

 

Nick Johnson and Aubrey
Huff and Mark DeRosa and Russell Branyan would be rentals.  Interested?

 

It’s still
primarily about adding an eighth-inning arm for me.

 

Depending on who you can get, pitcher or hitter or both, who do you
refuse to part with? 

 

With a shot at October, do you count on the latest influx of talent
(this week’s draft and the international class three weeks from now) into what’s
already the deepest system in the game and, in the case of rental pickups, the
potential draft pick compensation to help make up for the price in players it
would take to add the arm or the bat? 

 

What would it take to get those
players?

 

Actually, those aren’t the threshold questions. 

 

It’s not as simple as lining the names up on the whiteboard and deciding
where the line between “untouchable” and “available in this deal or that one”
goes.  That’s secondary.

 

The threshold question is this:

 

Is it time for Step Five?

 


You can read more from Jamey
Newberg
at www.NewbergReport.com.

 

2 Comments

I’m going to have to say wait until management knows without a doubt that the team is at step five before they pull the trigger. Continue with step three to fill the holes right now(e.g. Feliz, Moscoso, possibly Main(but probably not ready yet). Number one: we’ll reap the benefits of their exposure and excellerated development, not another team. Number two: the rest of the system’s players (Perez, Smoak, Weiland, Beavan, Boscan, etc.) will see that they will get their chance when the time comes, understanding that the club will follow through on its part to reap the rewards of their development. At least they see they see that they can, even as young minor leaguers, eventually be counted on to contribute to helping the big league club reach its’ goals. The fruits of their labors will be reaped, so to speak. Number three: it’s still June. We just lost two to Toronto (a good team, mind you) and the offense is starting to feel the effects of the loss of Hamilton. Fransisco’s prolonged absence will probably rear its’ ugly head sooner or later. Having said all of that, if we weather these current storms and are still in it with Hamilton and Fransisco back at the trade deadline and we have a chance to get Halladay. . .BANG! Thanks Jamey, love the Report!

in my opinion, unless we can get an ace pitcher, who will be with us for at least this season and next, guaranteed, then it is generally not worth being buyers in July. I’d much rather we found those ‘one or two players’ that we need from the inside than go trading for rental players. That’s not really worked for us in the past(usually).

As far as getting an impact bat…I’m not sure we need to. Yes, our offense has struggled recently, but it has 3 players in it that are still under that 750 at bat threshold, and Hamilton is out. I think this year will be a breakout year, but that NEXT year is still the year for step 5…unless of course, we can get an ace for a less than outrageous price in prospects, an ace that will be here for more than one season.

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